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#### The resolution demands advocacy of a federal policy

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action to bolster economic development between countries

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The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations.94 Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target state‟s run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective. Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries – those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system – i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not democratic – that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97 Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries – closer economic ties will develop the target state‟s dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual dependence). However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state‟s political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state‟s forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country‟s dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.98 Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state‟s behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state‟s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state‟s foreign policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.

#### The affirmative’s failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s transformative and intellectual potential.

#### First is limits --- Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis --- that’s key to decision-making

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean *Iliad* the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote weII-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Second is fairness --- what the aff said was not fair to the negative --- we have been excluded --- vote against the aff for not caring about capable opponents, key to success of ideas

**Hatab 2**, Prof of Philosophy @ Old Dominion University, (Lawrence J., The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147)

Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent. As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants**.** [25](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html#FOOT25) In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. [26](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html#FOOT26) An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights**,** not as something "natural" possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal, procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice.

#### Third is switch side debate— political agonism where the negative can respond is the most intellectually effective way to overcome moral hazards and make decisions-- process is more important than substance.

**Gutmann 96** Amy Gutmann , is the president of Penn and former prof @ Princeton, AND Dennis Thompson is Alfred North Whitehead Professor of Political Philosophy at Harvard University, Democracy and Disagreement, 1996 , pp 1

Of the challenges that American democracy faces today, none is more formidable than the problem of moral disagreement. Neither the theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found an adequate way to cope with conflicts about fundamental values. We address the challenge of moral disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life . Along with a growing number of other political theorists, we call this conception deliberative democracy . The core idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions. But the meaning and implications of the idea are complex . Although the idea has a long history, it is still in search of a theory. We do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative democracy, but we do hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of deliberation that is possible and desirable in the face of moral disagreement in democracies. Some scholars have criticized liberal political theory for neglecting moral deliberation. Others have analyzed the philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy, and still others have begun to explore institutional reforms that would promote deliberation. Yet nearly all of them stop at the point where deliberation itself begins. None has systematically examined the substance of deliberation-the theoretical principles that should guide moral argument and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public policy. That is our subject, and it takes us into the everyday forums of democratic politics, where moral argument regularly appears but where theoretical analysis too rarely goes. Deliberative democracy involves reasoning about politics, and nothing has been more controversial in political philosophy than the nature of reason in politics . We do not believe that these controversies have to be settled before deliberative principles can guide the practice of democracy . Since on occasion citizens and their representatives already engage in the kind of reasoning that those principles recommend, deliberative democracy simply asks that they do so more consistently and comprehensively. The best way to prove the value of this kind of reasoning is to show its role in arguments about specific principles and policies, and its contribution to actual political debates. That is also ultimately the best justification for our conception of deliberative democracy itself. But to forestall possible misunderstandings of our conception of deliberative democracy, we offer some preliminary remarks about the scope and method of this book. The aim of the moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy prescribes falls between impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is reciprocity, the subject of Chapter 2, but no less essential are the other principles developed in later chapters. When citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements. The precise content of reciprocity is difficult to determine in theory, but its general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It can be seen in the difference between acting in one's self-interest (say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or a lucky break) and acting fairly (following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt). In many of the controversies discussed later in the book, the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them. Even though the quality of deliberation and the conditions under which it is conducted are far from ideal in the controversies we consider, the fact that in each case some citizens and some officials make arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a deliberative perspective is not utopian. To clarify what reciprocity might demand under non-ideal conditions, we develop a distinction between deliberative and non deliberative disagreement. Citizens who reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong. They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken . (The abortion example-to which we often return in the book-is meant to be illustrative. For readers who deny that there is any room for deliberative disagreement on abortion, other political controversies can make the same point.) The presence of deliberative disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they should adopt. When a disagreement is not deliberative (for example, aboutapolicy to legalize discrimination against blacks and women), citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their opponents. In deliberative disagreement (for example, about legalizing abortion), citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement , and believe that, though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a morally robust democratic life. Although both of us have devoted some of our professional life to urging these ideas on public officials and our fellow citizens in forums of practicalpolitics, this book is primarily the product of scholarly rather than political deliberation. Insofar as it reaches beyond the academic community, it is addressed to citizens and officials in their more reflective frame of mind. Given its academic origins, some readers may be inclined to complain that only professors could be so unrealistic as to believe that moral reasoning can help solve political problems. But such a complaint would misrepresent our aims. To begin with, we do not think that academic discussion (whether in scholarly journals or college classrooms) is a model for moral deliberation in politics. Academic discussion need not aim at justifying a practical decision, as deliberation must. Partly for this reason, academic discussion is likely to be insensitive to the contexts of ordinary politics: the pressures of power, the problems of inequality, the demands of diversity, the exigencies of persuasion. Some critics of deliberative democracy show a similar insensitivity when they judge actual political deliberations by the standards of ideal philosophical reflection. Actual deliberation is inevitably defective, but so is philosophical reflection practiced in politics. The appropriate comparison is between the ideals of democratic deliberation and philosophical reflection , or between the application of eachin the nonideal circumstances of politics. We do not assume that politics should be a realm where thelogical syllogism rules. Nor do we expect even the more appropriate standard of mutual respect alwaysto prevail in politics. A deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and even violence. It is partly because moral argument has so much unrealized potential in democratic politics that we believe it deserves more attention. Because its place in politics is so precarious, the need to find it a more secure home and to nourish its development is all the more pressing. Yet because it is also already' pert of our common experience, we have reason to hope that it can survive and even prosper if philosophers along with citizens and public officials better appreciate its value in politics. Some readers may still wonder why deliberation should have such a prominent place in democracy. Surely, they may say, citizens should care more about the justice of public policies than the process by which they are adopted, at least so long as the process is basically fair and at least minimally democratic. One of our main aims in this book is to cast doubt on the dichotomy between policies andprocess that this concern assumes. Having good reason as individuals to believe that a policy is just does not mean that collectively as citizens we have sufficient justification to legislate on the basis of those reasons. The moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends in part on the moral quality of the process by whichcitizens collectively reach those judgments. Deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted. Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends.

#### Fourth is self-reflexivity—policy debate fosters a willingness to re-examine and reform ideals—solves authoritarianism. It’s the only portable skill—turning the case.

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** [Austin J. and David L., Professors at John Carroll University and University of Miami Respectively, “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making”, Twelth Edition, 2008]

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations’s resolutions. Debate about a possible military action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition. Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all make many decisions every day. To refinance or sell one’s home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car, what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIME magazine named YOU its “Person of the Year.” Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of “great men” in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs, online networking, YouTube, Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other “wikis,” knowledge and “truth” are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California’s requirement states: Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize, and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambiguous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive and deductive processes, including an understanding of the formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. Competency in critical thinking is a prerequisite to participating effectively in human affairs, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly competitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: ■ raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; ■ gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; ■ thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical consequences; and ■ communicates effectively with others in figuring out solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking “entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism.”1 Debate as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving uniquely promotes development of each of these skill sets. Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary research confirms the value of debate. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves the thinking of those involved.2 In particular, debate education improves the ability to think critically. In a comprehensive review of the relevant research, Kent Colbert concluded, “The debate–critical thinking literature provides presumptive proof favoring a positive debate–critical thinking relationship.”3 Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job offer, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for our product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Our model of debate is process, not product – decision-making is learned in a safe space of competing thought experiments

**Hanghoj 08** Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor. http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.

## Case

**Man is not gender neutral—interchanging it with people shapes reality perpetuating gender inequality and excluding women from this place**

**Writing Center** 20**10** (The Writing Center, University of North Carolina. “Gender-Sensitive Language.” February 11, 2010. <http://www.unc.edu/depts/wcweb/handouts/gender.html>, KD)

English speakers and writers have traditionally been taught to use masculine nouns and pronouns in situations where the gender of their subject(s) is unclear or variable, or when a group to which they are referring contains members of both sexes. For example, the US Declaration of Independence states that " . . . all men are created equal . . ." and most of us were taught in elementary school to understand the word "men" in that context includes both male and female Americans. In recent decades, however, as women have become increasingly involved in the public sphere of American life, writers have reconsidered the way they express gender identities and relationships. Because most English language readers no longer understand the word "man" to be synonymous with "people," writers today must think more carefully about the ways they express gender in order to convey their ideas clearly and accurately to their readers. Moreover, these issues are important for people concerned about issues of **social inequality**. There is a relationship between our language use and our social reality. If we "erase" women from language, that makes it easier to maintain gender inequality. As Professor Sherryl Kleinman (2000:6) has argued, [M]ale-based generics are another indicator—and, more importantly, a ***reinforcer*—of** a system in which "man" in the abstract and **men** in the flesh are privileged **over** **women**. **Words matter**, and our **language choices have consequences**. If we believe that women and men deserve social equality, then **we should think** seriously **about** how to reflect that belief in **our language use**. If you're reading this handout, you're probably already aware that tackling gender sensitivity in your writing is no small task, especially since there isn't yet (and there may never be) a set of concrete guidelines on which to base your decisions. Fortunately, there are a number of different strategies the gender-savvy writer can use to express gender relationships with precision. This handout will provide you with an overview of some of those strategies so that you can "mix and match" as necessary when you write.

**Masculine lenses make extinction inevitable and turn the case—vote negative to reject the affirmatives gendered lens—it’s the only way to open up new frameworks of thought**

**Clark 4—**French Professor of Conflict Resolution at George Mason University (Mary E, ‘Rhetoric, Patriarchy & War: Explaining the Dangers of "Leadership" in Mass Culture, Women and Language’ pg. 21, KD)

Today's Western patriarchal world view now dominates globalwide dialogue among the "leaders" of Earth's nearly two hundred nation-states. Its Machiavellian/Realpolitik assumptions about the necessity of' military power to preserve order within and between groups of humans trumps--and stifles--other potential viewpoints. Founded on the belief that "evil" is innate, it dictates that human conflict must be "controlled": global "law" backed by coercive force. This view, when cross-culturally imposed, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, thus "legitimating" an escalating use of force. Western leaders (male and female) use a rhetoric couched in a "hegemonic masculinity" to justify their ready use of military force to coerce "those who are against us" into compliance. This translates globally as "national leaders must never lose facet!" Changing this dominant paradigm requires dismantling the hierarchic hegemony of masculine militarism and its related economic institutions, through global cross-cultural dialogues, thus replacing a hegemonic world view and institutions with new, more adaptive visions, woven out of the most useful remnants of multiple past cultural stories. The paper concludes with a few examples where people around the worm are doing just this--using their own small voices to insert their local "sacred social story" into the global dialogue. This global process--free from a hegemonic militaristic rhetoric--has the potential to initiate a planetary dialogue where "boundaries" are no longer borders to be defended, but sites of social ferment and creative adaptation. When the call came for papers on War, Language, and Gender, referring us to Carol Cohn's seminal paper "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," (1) I at first felt that little more could be added on the subject. But events in Washington in the ensuing weeks stimulated me to a broader "take" on this topic. Defense intellectuals, after all, are embedded in a whole culture, and the interaction is two-way. Not only does their strategic framework with its euphemistic language about war and killing have the outcome of forcing society to think in their terms; their framework and language developed in response to our deeply embedded, Western cultural image of a Machiavellian / neo-Darwinian universe. In other words, militarism and the necessity for organized physical force (2) emerge out of culturewide assumptions about human nature. Throughout historical times these assumptions have repeatedly proved to be self-fulfilling prophecies. The pervasive perception of enemy-competitors has generated violent conflicts that flared up and died back, only to flare up again through our failure to achieve deep resolution and, especially, to alter our basic beliefs about human nature and our consequent social institutions. Today our species, politically, comprises some 180190 "nations" of varying cultural homogeneity and moral legitimacy, not to mention size and physical power. Regardless of their indigenous, internal cultural preferences, their cross-national interactions are institutionalized to fit a framework long established by former Western colonial powers among themselves. In other words, the global "reality" constructed by Western patriarchies-a Realpolitik, ultimately grounded in military power-has come to define day-to-day cross-national politics. During the era of the Cold War, this resulted in small, powerless nations seeking alliances with one or other superpower, which offered not only development aid but military protection, and, for locally unpopular, but "cooperating" leaders, small arms to maintain order at home. The "end" of the Cold War brought little change in this pervasive global militarism (though it did strengthen the role of economic hegemony by the remaining superpower (3)). The enormous technological "improvements"-i.e. efficiency in killing power-in weaponry of all types over the past few decades has now resulted in a dangerously over-armed planet that simultaneously faces a desperate shortage of resources available for providing the world's people with water, energy, health care, education, and the infrastructure for distributing them. While our environmental and social overheads continue to mount, our species seems immobilized, trapped in an institutionalized militarism-an evolutionary cul-de-sac! We need new insights-as Cohn said, a new language, a new set of metaphors, a new mental framework-for thinking, dialoguing and visioning new patterns of intersocietal interaction.

#### The standing reserve argument is a slipper slope fallacy – denies individual freedom and turns the case

Wolcher 05

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But this account of Kants blindness to temporality tells us why he was blind - it does not yet tell us how the event of making-blind occurred. Let us therefore ask how, exactly, does any particular 'A => B' enslave those who announce and believe in it? More generally, what is it about believing in idea 'X' (or Tiaving' it in Heidegger's sense of a fore-having) that entails anything whatsoever? These questions suggest the hypothesis that Heidegger may have unreasonably denied his predecessors the very gift of freedom that he acknowledged in himself and, moreover, that in doing so he relied on a sort of crude formalism, according to which the A of a philosopher's belief in 'A => B' necessarily leads to (=>) the B of his or her thinking, writing and other comportment. By way of evidence for this hypothesis, consider the following passage, in which Heidegger explains why metaphysics thinks in terms of a 'highest being', rather than experiencing being as such:¶ Metaphysics has this character because it is what it is: the representation of beings as beings. Metaphysics has no choice. As metaphysics, U is by its very essence excluded from the experience of Being; for it always represents beings only with an eye to that aspect of them that has already manifested itself as beings. (1998:288)¶ On its face, this text seems to claim that when metaphysics asserts 'A (the highest being) => B (other beings)', this very way of thinking and talking compels people to ignore being as such, and compels them to slide down a slippery slope towards the vacuity of technological thinking and its construction of a soulless world in the form of a standing reserve of useful matter. The best analogy to this thesis of necessity comes from the sphere of legal theory. The statement 'metaphysics has no choke' is akin to the formalist assertion that words like 'due process' automatically produce their correct interpretation (and proscribe all incorrect interpretations), or that the word 'white' in a contract could never, under any circumstances, be rightly interpreted to mean black. It is important to understand that neither legal formalism nor Heidegger place that which they think determines human behaviour into the category of psychology, for legal formalism, legal texts are metaphysically related to their correct interpretations; and for Heidegger, our fore-havings and fore-conceptions are ontological determinations of our being-in-the-world, and therefore¶ prior to all merely 'founded' modes of explanation, such as psychology. Science explains why and how A leads to B in terms of causal mechanisms and statistical probabilities: not so legal formalism and Heidegger. This makes Heidegger's assertion that 'metaphysics has no choice' all the more puzzling: if believing in or having this or that version of 'A => B' leaves metaphysics no choice, and if this phenomenon of being-left-no-choice is not to be explained causally, men how does 'A => B' perform its dark magic? How does it manage to eclipse human freedom?¶ If the above-quoted passage on metaphysics and necessity were an outlier - an isolated instance of hyperbole on Heidegger's part - then it would be both possible and appropriate to overlook it. But the passage does not stand alone. Countless other similarly worded passages, of like import, are scattered like autumn leaves throughout his oeuvre. Here are just a few of them, by way of illustration:¶ • 'Calculative thinking compels itself into a compulsion to master everything on the basis of the consequential correctness of its procedure' (1998:235)¶ • 'Every science adheres only to the penultimate and must presuppose the ultimate as first' (1992a: 160)¶ • 'Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it' (1977:6)¶ • 'Enframing (Ge-stett) challenges itself forth into the frenziedness of ordering that blocks every view into the coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically endangers the essence of truth' (1977:33)¶ 'The still hidden truth of Being is withheld from metaphysical humanity. The labouring animal is left to the giddy whirl of its products so that it may tear itself to pieces and annihilate itself in empty nothingness' (2003a: 87)¶ 'The tradition of the truth about beings, which goes under the title "metaphysics", develops into a pile of distortions, no longer recognising itself, covering up the primordial essence of Being' (2003a: 19)¶ 'Being as presencing in the sense of calculable material... claims all the inhabitants of the earth in a uniform manner without the inhabitants of the non-European continents explicitly knowing this or even being able or wanting to know of the origin of mis determination of Being' (1972:7)¶ 'Metaphysics, insofar as it always represents beings as beings, does not recall Being itself' (Kaufmann 1956:208)¶ 'Being has brought it to pass in history that there is nothing to Being itself (1991: IV, 222)¶ The primordial problem of ground cannot be conceived on the basis of propositional truth' (1984:128)¶ • In the history of metaphysics "being" is always grasped as beingness of beings and thus as these beings themselves' (1999a: 177)¶ • Representational thought 'cannot overcome Descartes, nor even rise up against him, for how shall the consequence ever attack the ground on which it stands?' (1977:148)¶ After reading these and other similar passages, one almost wishes one could bring Heidegger back to life and ask him to recall his conception of freedom as the taking and the giving of grounds. Whatever happened to this glorious freedom, and where did its 'giving' part go during the dismal history of being conceived as the history of metaphysics? Was freedom during the age of metaphysics like a Xerox machine, exactly reproducing the thought 'A => B' indefinitely, until some 'great thinker' came along who somehow managed to create a new image of A ^ B, which freedom then chose to copy for a long while until it was replaced, and so on and so on, down to the present day?¶ These questions bring to mind Derrida's influential critique of structuralism in social theory and philosophy: the thought that structure necessitates social life seems to deny all possibility of change through 'play\* (Kamuf 1991: vii-viii). Could it be that Heidegger was a closet or unconscious structuralist, despite the fact that he derided any philosophy which stops short of being as such as but 'an unattached shifting around in concepts as mere signs'? (1985: 65). Could it really be the case that Heidegger thought that the 'A => B' which characterised any particular era during the long history of metaphysics necessarily entailed the behaviours of those who internalised it as the self-evident truth, entailed that this particular ground led to its world in the way that '1 +1' leads to '27¶ I am using the word 'entailed' quite carefully here, for despite his obvious sensitivity to historicity and the indeterminacy of language, Heidegger's critique of metaphysics betrays the belief, at least at some level, that something important depends and must depend on the way people talk and think. I say this not just because of the material quoted earlier, but because of a thought experiment that I have performed many times, and that I invite you to perform. I imagine taking Heidegger to a world that cannot help but gratify and please in every respect - a world without pain or suffering, for example, full of genuine joy and satisfaction, where people always treat both nature and one another with enormous respect, compassion and love, and where no one has ever heard of war, genocide, cruelty and environmental degradation. In this world, rivers such as Holderlin's Der Ister sparkle and shine in people's lives in a way that would please Heidegger even during his most pernickety and poetic moods (1996a). The main problem is that all of the people in this world (except Heidegger, of course) talk and have always talked like vulgar yokels, in terms of representation, either/or, and the metaphysics of presence. Phrases such as 'the worldhood of the world' (1962:¶ 24) mean nothing to these people: for them, the world is the earth, a thing is just a thing, and an appropriation is what their legislature does when it votes to allocate funds. Every now and then, however, these people do ask themselves 'Why is there something rather than nothing?', after which they always have a faraway look on their faces and exclaim 'Wow!', without further comment. In other words, the people in this world experience the wonder of being as such without ever feeling the need to think it¶ I have to admit it: when I run this thought experiment, I almost always see Heidegger having a massive nervous breakdown from irresolvable cognitive dissonance. I am referring to the kind of dissonance that I imagine would spring up in him after he observed the utter absence of any apparent relation of 'leading to' (^) between these people's manner of speaking and thinking (A) and the shape of the world in which they live (B). Unless he believed in the order-giving comfort of something like a causal nexus between language and world, why did the early Heidegger, for example, think that traditional ontology had 'covered up' the question of Being, and why did he think that the¶ destruction (Destruktiort) of the history of ontology was worth doing at all? (1962: 44). And why did the later Heidegger think that calculative thinking 'compels itself' to mastery of the world? (1998:235). and our actions has always struck me as drawing a useful antithesis to our deeply ingrained prejudice that ways of talking and thinking really do and must matter: 'certainly our opinions, valuations, and tables of goods are among the most powerful gears in the clockwork of our actions', he wrote, 'but in every particular case the law of tlieir mechanism is unprovable' (Nietzsche 1995: 335). Although Heidegger knew this too, I am not speaking of merely 'knowing' something here, but rather of a tendency that lies buried deep in all of the ways of Western thought: the tendency to think that if the abstraction A is counted as 'true', then belief in the abstraction must lead to concrete outcome B.¶ Although he probably did not recognise this tendency in himself, Heidegger would undoubtedly have agreed that as a general matter the tendency to find a 'hardwired' connection between beings remains stuck at a level of thinking that is not yet mature. 'Mature' (ie Heideggerian) thought recognises that all necessity is grounded in unity - A cannot 'compel' 8 unless A is stable enough to be described as a unity resting in itself. Nietzsche's trenchant remark on the absence of a provable link between our opinions

#### Death is bad

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Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in etaphysical lightening strikes. 80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life. 81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.

#### Voting aff doesn’t affirm excess or sovereignty---they only cause self-indulgent babble

Paul Mann 99, Literature prof @ Pomona, 1999, Masocriticism, p. 67-69

I would like at one and the same time to affirm this model and to dismiss it as the most desperate alibi of all. For “sacrificial consumption” can never become an explicit critical motive.13 At the moment it presents itself as a proper element of some critical method, it degenerates into another useful trope, another bit of intellectual currency, another paper-thin abyss, another proxy transgression; and the force of transgression moves elsewhere, beneath a blinder spot in the critical eye.’4 Questions of motive or understanding, the fact that one might be self-critical or at least aware of recuperation, are immaterial: what is at stake here is not self-consciousness but economics, material relations of appropriation and exclusion, assimilation and positive loss. Whatever transgression occurs in writing on Bataille does so only through the stupid recuperation and hence evacuation of the whole rhetoric and dream of transgression, only insofar as the false profundity of philosophy or theory evacuates the false profundities it apes. To justify this as the sublime loss of loss is merely to indulge a paradoxical figure. Excess is not a project but a by-product of any discourse; the interest of Bataillean discourse lies chiefly in the compulsive and symptomatic way it plays with its feces. The spectacle of critics making fools of themselves does not reveal the sovereign truth of death: it is only masocritical humiliation, a pathological attempt to disavow the specter of death. As for the present essay, it makes no claims to any redeeming sacrifice. Far from presenting you with a truer Bataille, far from speaking in his voice more clearly than his other readers, this essay pleads guilty to the indictment against every appropriation. Until philosophy and theory squeal like a pig before Bataille’s work, as he claims to have done before Dali’s canvases, there will be no knowledge of Bataille. In the end, one might have to take an even stricter view: there is no discourse of transgression, either on or by Bataille. None at all. It would be necessary to write a ‘Postscript to Transgression” were it not for the fact that Foucault already wrote it in his ‘Preface,” were it not for the fact that Bataille himself wrote it the moment before he first picked up his pen. It makes no difference whether one betrays Bataille, because one is hip to heterology or does it by accident, whether one lip syncs Bataille’s rhetoric or drones on in the most tedious exposition. All of these satellite texts are not heliotropic in relation to the solar anus of Bataille’s writing, or the executioners he hoped (really?) would meet him in the Bois de Boulogne, or dépensives in spite of themselves. It would be sentimental to assign them such privileges. They merely fail to fail. They are symptoms of a discourse in which everyone is happily transgressing everyone else and nothing ever happens, traces of a certain narcissistic pathos that never achieves the magnificent loss Bataille’s text conveniently claims to desire, and under whose cover it can continue to account for itself, hoarding its precious debits in a masocriticism that is anything but sovereign and gloriously indifferent. What is given to us, what is ruinously and profitably exchanged, is a lie. Heterology gives the lie to meaning and discourse gives the lie to transgression, in a potlatch that reveals both in their most essential and constitutive relation. Nothing is gained by this communication except profit-taking from lies. We must indict Bataille as the alibi that allows all of this writing to go on and on, pretending it is the nothing it is not, and then turn away from Bataille as from a sun long since gone nova, in order to witness the slow freezing to death of every satellite text. The sacrificial consumption of Bataille has played itself out; the rotten carcass has been consumed: no more alibis. What is at stake is no longer ecstatic sexuality or violent upheavals or bloody sacrifices under the unblinking eye of the sun; nor was it ever, from the very beginning of Bataille’s career. These are merely figures in the melodramatic theater of what is after all a “soft expenditure” (Hollier 1989, xv), a much more modest death, a death much closer to home. It has never been more than a question of the death of theory and of theory itself as death. Of theory-death. A double fatality.

# 2NC

## Framework

#### Engagement is defined by the means, not the goal – it must use the promise of rewards and not punishment

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Engagement is more than appeasement, however. It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order. In practice, engagement may be distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the target's behavior.

#### Institutional rules are a crucial precondition for Nietzschean freedom --- their framework causes mass havoc that undermines true creativity

Hatab 2 (Lawrence, Professor at ODU, “Prospects for a Democratic Agon”, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 24)

Before exploring these questions and confronting Nietzsche's attitude toward democracy, it is important to set the stage by considering the matter of institutions, without which political philosophy could very likely not get off the ground. Modern societies, at least, cannot function without institutions and the coercive force of law. Appel, like many interpreters, construes Nietzsche's "political" thought as advancing more an "aesthetic" activity than institutional governance (NCD, p.160ff). Supposedly Nietzsche envisions an elite who compete with each other for creative results in isolation from the mass public; indeed the elite simply use the masses as material for their creative work, without regard for the fate or welfare of the general citizenry. Appel maintains that such a political aesthetics is problematic because it is incompatible with the maintenance of stable institutions. And Nietzsche is also supposed to eschew the rule of law in favor of the hubris of self-policing (NCD, p.165). If this were true, one would be hard pressed to find Nietzsche relevant for any political philosophy, much less a democratic one. It is a mistake, however, to read Nietzsche in simple terms as being against institutions and the rule of law on behalf of self-creation. First of all, even Nietzsche's early celebration of the Dionysian should not be taken as an anti- or extra-political gesture. In BT 21, Nietzsche insists that the Apollonian has coequal status with the Dionysian, and the former is specifically connected with the political order, which is needed to temper the Dionysian impulse toward "ecstatic brooding" and "orgiastic self-annihilation." Those who read Nietzsche as resisting "normalization" and "discipline" (this includes most postmodern readings and Appel's as well 12 ), are not on very firm ground either. For one thing, Nietzschean creative freedom is selective and most people should be ruled by normative orders, because universal unrestricted freedom would cause havoc. 14 Moreover, even selective creative freedom is not an abandonment of order and constraint. Creativity breaks free of existing structures, but only to establish new ones. Shaping new forms requires formative powers prepared by disciplined skills and activated by refined instruments of production. Accordingly, creativity is a kind of "dancing in chains" (WS 140). 15 Creative freedom, then, is not an abandonment of constraint, but a disruption of structure that still needs structure to prepare and execute departures from the norm.

# 1NR

## Case

**Sexist language shapes reality—creates a patriarchal society.**

**SEP** 20**10** (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Feminist Philosophy of Language” <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-language/>, KD)

Spender and others also suggest that the **maleness of language constrains thought**, **imposing** a **male worldview** on all of us, and **making alternative** **visions** of reality impossible, or at least very **difficult** to articulate. These arguments often draw upon the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Sapir 1949; Whorf 1976). This is generally described as roughly the hypothesis that “our worldview is determined by the structures of the particular language that we happen to speak” (Cameron 1998b: 150). Some suggest that male power over language allows men to shape not just thought, but also reality. For example, Spender claims that men “created language, thought, and reality” (1985: 143). This is a very strong version of what Sally Haslanger has called discursive constructivism.[3] She defines this view as follows: Something is discursively constructed just in case it is the way it is, to some substantial extent, because of what is attributed (and/or self-attributed) to it. (Haslanger 1995: 99) Feminists like Spender and Catherine MacKinnon (1989) argue that male power over language has allowed them to create reality. This is partly due to the fact that our categorizations of reality inevitably depend on our social perspective: “there is no ungendered reality or ungendered perspective”. (MacKinnon 1989: 114. Haslanger discusses this argument in detail in her 1995.)

#### Their focus on crafting the self is the politics of fascism --- outwardly focused democratic participation and consequentialism are key

Zamponi 12—professor of sociology, UC Santa Barbra (SIMONETTA FALASCA-ZAMPONI, The politics of aesthetics: Mussolini and fascist Italy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/simonetta-falasca-zamponi/politics-of-aesthetics-mussolini-and-fascist-italy)

For Benjamin, the paradox was that what he called ‘the age of mechanical reproduction’, rather than fulfilling its “natural” mission of freeing people from the chains of an enchanted vision of the world - one that made people feel miniscule and in awe of authority - ended up instead becoming an instrument of domination. Liberation was countered by submission. Freed from the dogma of the Church and other institutions, thanks to the availability of information and new technologies, the so-called masses were nevertheless prey to re-enchantment, especially through new charismatic styles of politics that fed off myths and rituals: the case of Mussolini’s Italy (and, of course, Nazi Germany too). This idea of “anaesthetized aesthetics,” to use an expression by Susan Buck-Morss, perfectly captures Mussolini’s approach to politics and his role in the government of the polity. How was his politics anaesthetic? In my research of Mussolini’s writings and speeches, the trope of the politician as artist emerged as one of the strongest and most frequent, and not as a mere formula or superficial reference but as a core feature of Mussolini’s own understanding of politics. In Mussolini’s view, for politics not to be a dirty word that reflected the failing political class’s capacity for endless debates and conservative behaviour, it had to play a role much more active and daring; politics was supposed to change a society’s whole way of living and thinking. The issue was not one of mere shifts in government: the old game of political compromises and formulas. With fascism, the goal was to revolutionize the meaning of politics itself in order to construct a new Italy on the ruins of the old one. Here is where the idea of the politician as artist comes in. The artist politician destroys in order to create. “Moulding,” “sculpting,” and “shaping” were terms that became familiar in Mussolini’s discourse when he referred to the masses and their transformation into ideal fascist models. Politics was an art for Mussolini, and he liked to think of himself as a sculptor who alone could render hard material into malleable constructions, pliable artifacts. Is there anything more radical in terms of disregard for people, or more opposed to the rules of democratic participation, than this approach that considers people as things? - an approach that in my opinion overlaps with and defines totalitarianism. The second element of fascism’s aesthetic politics was the expressive means employed by Mussolini, as a result of his underpinning idea of a disciplined, organized harmonious "aesthetic" form that is supposed to define the whole of Italian society under fascism - to actualize his role as artist politician. This is certainly the more familiar, visually evident, and even at times caricatured aspect of fascism’s aesthetic politics. It encompasses the plethora of rituals and symbols, which attracted the attention of many, including Hitler as well as Stalin, especially during the early years of the regime. In part the natural outcome of a movement that wanted to distinguish itself from traditional politics, in part a reflection of the youthful character of its members, and in part an expression of cultural trends of the time, fascism emerged as a semiotically rich phenomenon. Uniforms of adherents, although not colourful, were distinctive; ritualistic ceremonies and gestures identified the special nature of the group; myths framed the cultural horizon of its followers, and so on and so forth. Such semiotic excess did not merely emerge at the origins of the movement, but continued to be augmented over time with new or newly redefined symbolic means. Their importance within the regime increased, at times exponentially, such as in the case of the Roman salute or the goose step, and of course of the myth of Mussolini, which was at the centre of this highly orchestrated ritualistic apparatus. Though shifting in style and focus over the years, Mussolini’s centrality in the fascist constellation remained unchallenged, unsurpassed, and ever growing indeed, gaining traction also thanks to the ability of the media to diffuse Mussolini’s image via the printed press, cinema, and the radio. From lion tamer to rural worker, motorcyclist, father, commander, Mussolini’s figure affirmed fascism’s value and helped build fascism as a longstanding regime. Two decades – not an insignificant stretch of time. A new Italian man This leads me to the last element of my discussion: the effectiveness of Mussolini’s aesthetic approach to politics. The question is tricky because there is no exact way to know the answer. What motivates me to raise this issue is however not so much the desire to find definite answers but the need to emphasize once again that Mussolini’s deep subscription to an aestheticized understanding of politics led him to play down, or not necessarily focus on, the outcome of his approach. Mussolini believed that the goal of remaking the Italians would naturally be attained. It was not an issue of if or how. Changes in the Italians’ gestures, rituals, ways of speaking, writing, etc. would necessarily bring about the change Mussolini was pursuing: a new Italian man would be born out of this artistic endeavour. Mussolini had undeniable faith in this project and was not very rational about it, I would underline, which again demonstrates the radical nature of his subscription to an aesthetic understanding of politics. More strategic objectives often took a back seat in his agenda, something that in different ways we find typical of the other totalitarian experiments in Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Aesthetic goals were absolute and independent of any ethical issues.

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## Case

**The discourse of the negative creates dichotomies between the disabled and non-disabled which destroy the disabled identity and excludes certain disabilities from the disabled community destroying social justice**

**Humphrey, 2k**

(Jill C. Faculty of applied social science @ the Open University, Researching disability politics, or, some problems with the social model in practice, Disability & Society 15.1)

ABSTRACT This article arises from a research project involving the disabled members’ group in UNISON, and problematises the social model which explicitly undergirds the discourses and practices of this group. In abstract terms, **there are dangers that the social model can be interpreted in a way which privileges some impaired identities over others, sanctions a separatist ghetto which cannot reach out to other groups of disabled and disadvantaged people, and weaves a tangled web around researchers who adhere to the emancipatory paradigm.** In concrete terms, **these dangers are explored with reference to the stories of impaired people who believe that they are excluded from the disabled members’ group**, the **predicaments of ex-disabled and differently-disabled people in relation to the movement, and the culture of suspicion surrounding academics, particularly the `non-disabled’ researcher as would-be ally**. It is argued that, whilst such identities and issues might appear to be `marginal’ ones in the sense of occurring at the boundary of disabled communities, disability politics and disability studies, they should not be `marginalised’ by disabled activists and academics, and indeed that they pose challenges to our collective identities, social movements, theoretical models and research paradigms which need to be addressed. Introduction The social model arose as a reaction against the medical model of disability, which reduced disability to impairment so that disability was located within the body or mind of the individual, whilst the power to de® ne, control and treat disabled people was located within the medical and paramedical professions (Oliver, 1996). Under the bio-medical reÂ gime, material deprivation and political disenfranchisement continued unabated, whilst institutional discrimination and social stigmatisation were exacerbated by segregation (Barnes 1991). In this context, the social model harbours a number of virtues in rede® ning disability in terms of a disabling environment, repositioning disabled people as citizens with rights, and reconfiguring the responsibilities for creating, sustaining and overcoming disablism. Indeed, when the social model is confronted with the resurrection of the medical model in its bio-medical, psychological, psychiatric and sociological guises, then it needs to be vigorously defended (Shakespeare & Watson, 1997). However, this does not mean that the social model is flawless, in either its design or its implementation. More precisely, if it is interpreted in a way which undermines the very communities, politics and studies it was supposed to enhance, it is incumbent upon us to inquire `What’ s going on? What’ s going wrong?’ A fruitful starting point and indeed one which already contains an answer to the above questions, is to recognise that there are two main versions of the social model, which are necessarily interrelated, but which will lead into opposing directions if we are not careful. In academic texts, the social model begins with an appreciation of the individual and collective experiences of disabled people (e.g. Swain et al., 1993). It goes on to elaborate the nature of a disabling society in terms of the physical environment, the political economy, the welfare state and sedimented stereotypes (e.g. Barnes et al., 1999). Finally, it endorses a critical or emancipatory paradigm of research (e.g. Barnes & Mercer 1997a) . This analysis lends itself to a recognition of the array of diverse experiences of disabling barriers; a realistic appraisal of the need for broader political coalitions to combat entrenched structural inequalitie s and cultural oppressions; and an openness about the potential for non-disabled people to contribute to critical theory and research. **In activist discourses, the emphasis is upon the fact that it is non-disabled people who have engineered the physical environment, dominated the political economy, managed welfare services, controlled research agendas, recycled pejorative labels and images, and translated these into eugenics policies**. **This analysis lends itself to a dichotomy between non-disabled and disabled people which becomes coterminous with the dichotomy between oppressors and oppressed; and this tightens the boundaries around the disabled identity, the disabled people’ s movement and disability research**. **Whilst this hermeneutic closure is designed to ward off incursions and, therefore, oppressions from non-disabled people, it may also have some unfortunate consequences.** I would like to illustrate these consequences by drawing upon a research project involving the four self-organised groups (SOGs) for women, black people, disabled members, and lesbian and gay members in UNISON (see Humphrey, 1998, 1999). Material drawn directly from conversations and observations in the disabled members’ group is supplemented by interview transcripts with members of the lesbian and gay group, my own personal experiences of and re¯ ections upon disability and discrimination, and recent developments in various social movements and critical research texts. The rest of the article depicts three problematic consequences of the social model in practice and redirects them back to the social model as critical questions which need to be addressed by its proponents. First, **there are questions of disability identity where a kind of `purism’ has been cultivated from the inside of the disability community. Here, it can be demonstrated that some people with certain types of impairments have not been welcomed into the disabled members’ group** in UNISON, **which means that the disability community is not yet inclusive, and that its membership has been skewed in a particular direction.** Second, **there are questions of disability politics where a kind of `separatism’ has been instituted.** Whilst the UNISON constitution allows for separatism to be supplemented by both coalitions and transformations, these have been slow to materialise in practice, and the dearth of such checks and balances in the wider disabled peoples’ movement **implies that the danger of developing a specific kind of disability ghetto is more acute**. Third, there are questions of disability research where a kind of `provisionalism’ is suspended over the role of researchers. The most obvious dilemmas arise for the non-disabled researcher as would-be ally, but it is becoming clear that disabled academics can also be placed in a dilemmatic position, and it is doubtful whether any researcher can practise their craft to their own standards of excellence when operating under the provisos placed upon them by political campaigners.